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THE FUTURE OF CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM AND EMPIRICAL LEGAL

SCHOLARSHIP: A REPLY
Michael Heiset
I will resist temptation and avoid dwelling upon Professor Tobias's generous comments' regarding my empirical study of case disposition time in civil trials. 2 Indeed, given Professor Tobias's graciousness, I am severely tempted to leave well enough alone. However, one particular aspect of Professor Tobias's Response-his implicit treatment of issues relating to both the supply of and demand
for empirical legal scholarship-raises an important issue that warrants further discussion.
In Justice Delayed? and other work,3 I make a case for the increased production of empirical legal scholarship. In Justice Delayed?, I present findings from my initial study of civil case disposition time. By empirically analyzing a large national sample of civil
cases, I identify specific variables that influence case disposition time.
I then compare the group of variables that emerges as influential from
my study and the group of variables that frequently receives attention
from policymakers and recent civil justice reform legislation. Because these two groups of variables are not the same, I suggest that
future efforts to reform the civil justice system should consider the
limited but growing empirical scholarship. Much of my argument for
increased empirical legal scholarship thus far has focused principally
on supply-side issues. Implicit in my argument is the assumption that
an increase in the supply of empirical legal scholarship will influence
(increase) the demand for such work.
In his Response to Justice Delayed?, Professor Tobias generally
accepts my argument for increased attention to and development of
our empirical legal scholarship base, especially where it bears on civil

t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. A.B., Stanford University; J.D.,
University of Chicago; Ph.D., Northwestern University.
1 See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Delay and Empirical Data: A Response to Professor
Heise, 51 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 235 (2001).
2 See Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?:An EmpiricalAnalysis of Civil Case Disposition
Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L REV. 813 (2000).
3 See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L REV. 807

(1999).
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justice reform.4 More importantly, he provides additional examples
in the civil justice area of the problems that arise when the lawmakers
and policymakers who formulate and implement legal reforms ignore
germane social science. I take the overall thrust of Professor Tobias's
Response to underscore empirical legal scholarship's particular salience to legal reform generally and civil justice reform in particular.
The larger point that data rather than anecdote
should inform public
5
policy and legal reform appears to unite us.
Professor Tobias's Response instructively spans both the supply
and demand sides of the equation. In so doing, he illustrates important limitations to my operating assumption regarding the relation
between the supply of and demand for empirical legal scholarship.
Professor Tobias illustrates the possibility that the demand for empirical scholarship might not respond (positively) to an increased supply
of such scholarship, especially if one set of consumers-policymakers
and lawmakers-does not develop a taste for or appreciation of empirical studies. Professor Tobias is not alone in this concern.6 In this
Reply, I take up more directly the supply-side aspects of the empirical
legal scholarship issue, with particular attention to possible interactions between demand and supply.
Justice Delayed? explains the uneasy relation between social
science (in this instance, empirical legal research) and lawmakers in
the civil justice reform context by emphasizing the relative dearth of
helpful empirical research.7 Professor Tobias adds factors to my explanation such as insufficient or unclear communications among interested parties.8 More importantly, he also points out that lawmakers
simply might ignore or, worse still, not want empirical legal research. 9 Professor Tobias's descriptions of specific instances involving the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,10 promulgation of the 2000
civil procedure amendments," and the 1993 amendment of Rule 2612

4 See Tobias, supranote 1, at 246-47.

5 Compare Tobias, supranote 1, at 249 ("[T]here must be considerable, additional rigorous assessment of the civil justice system before it will be possible to reach definitive conclusions about precisely how they operate and might be improved."), with Heise, supra note 2, at
848-49 (arguing for more empirical research that will inform reformers seeking to improve the
civil justice system). For a discussion about the influence of anecdotal evidence on public
health policy, see David A. Hyman, Lies, DamnedLies, andNarrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797 (1998).
6 See, e.g., James J. White, Phoebe's Lament, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2773, 2774 (2000)
("[L]egislators consume little of [the empirical research done by law professors].").
7 See Heise, supra note 2, at 818-22 (discussing a RAND evaluation of the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990-the only major research project).
8 See Tobias, supranote 1, at 242-43.
9 See id. at 247 ("It bears reiteration that even the finest empirical data alone will not
foster improvement, unless procedural policymakers consider and employ the information
which evaluators have collected.").
'0 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994).
11 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340, 344-46 (U.S. 2000).
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aptly illustrate how policymakers can ignore data even in those instances in which germane data are available.' 3 Professor Tobias's
comments raise important questions bearing on the relation between
the supply of and demand for empirical legal scholarship.
To the extent that Professor Tobias's assessment is correct, an
immediate question arises: why would lawmakers and policymakers
ignore empirical legal research? In a recent Michigan Law Review
symposium issue focusing on empirical research in commercial transactions, 14 Professor James White bemoans the lack of relevant empirical research and notes that what little work exists "has had a most
limited impact on commercial legislation."' 15 Indeed, Professor
White's observations call into question the underlying point of the
symposium. In his essay, White identifies possible structural and
non-structural reasons for this relative lack of demand.' 6 According
to White, structural reasons include the types of problems lawmakers
confront, aspects relating to the legislatures themselves, and characteristics peculiar to empirical legal research. 17 Non-structural reasons
include lawmakers' skepticism of and unfamiliarity with empirical
research.' 8 Professor White notes that empirical legal scholarship's
weak influence-at least in the commercial transactions area9--is not
a function of any defects in the empirical work; rather it is a function
of lawmakers' resistance to using such information.
Insofar as both Professor Tobias and I (and, presumably, Professor White and others) call for more empirical work to be undertaken
and used as an evidentiary foundation for future civil justice reform,
Professor White's impressions of the commercial transactions area
are educational and must be assessed. Although some might quibble
with Professor White's characterization of empirical works' influence
in the commercial transactions area, his is certainly a plausible characterization. However, even if Professor White's observation is correct with respect to commercial transaction law, I am not prepared to
generalize such a finding to all other legal areas. Moreover, the audience for empirical legal scholarship includes more than lawmakers.
Despite my reluctance, however, it is clear that the implications for
other areas are potentially quite severe. Finally, his assessment of the
commercial transactions area, however disconcerting to empirical
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (imposing a duty of initial disclosure and requiring a pre-scheduling

conference meeting of the parties).
13 See Tobias, supranote 1, at 245-46.
14 See Symposium, EmpiricalResearch in Commercial Transactions,98 MICH. L. REV.
2421 (2000).
15 White, supra note 6, at 2774.
16 See i1L
17 See id. at 2778-79.
"S See id. at 2776-78.
19 See id. at 2774 ("[E]mpirical work has had a most limited impact on commercial legislation and.. . strong reasons will keep it so.").
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legal scholars, may be both correct and generalizable to other areas of
the law. More alarming is that if empirical legal research is not taken
seriously by legislators and policymakers in the commercial area-an
area that benefits from a comparatively ample supply of data amenable to research-it is even less likely to be taken seriously in other
areas where available data are scarce.
Other scholars advance perspectives less dire than those articulated by Professors White and, to a lesser extent, Tobias. Other avenues exist that might help stimulate lawmakers and policymakers'
appetite for empirical research. Professor Hershkoff suggests that
judges, through their exercise of judicial review, can encourage lawmakers to consider social science evidence in their policymaking duties.20 Other scholars suggest that lawmakers will resist relying on
empirical research until they understand the basic methods of social
science.21 Professor Faigman notes that education can eliminate some
barriers that too often separate lawmakers and social science research.22 Similarly, Professor Hanna seeks to stimulate lawmakers'
appetites for empirical research by imploring researchers to present
their findings in a manner that is more generally accessible to those
who might not be experts in a particular field.23
My implicit assumption that an increased supply of empirical legal scholarship will positively influence the demand for such research
remains a possibility, yet it does not reflect the full richness and contours of the relations between supply and demand in this context.
Professor Tobias's Response and other related works make it clear
that the relationship between the supply of and demand for empirical
legal scholarship is a complicated one. Studies of these interactions
in general and the influence (if any) of empirical studies on specific
legislation in particular deserve increased scholarly attention.
Exam24
ples of such research efforts in the social sciences abound.
I remain delighted by Professor Tobias's endorsement of my call
for greater empirical work in the civil justice area. The informed and
helpful observations of Professors Tobias and White about the de20 See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
RationalityReview, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1132, 1177 (1999).
21 See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science
to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1080-81 (1989).
2 See id. at 1081.
2 See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic
Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1505, 1582-83 (1998).
2 For example, the influence of a seminal piece of education research conducted by Professor James S. Coleman and colleagues on decades of educational policy, see JAMES S.
COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966), has received considerable

scholarly attention. For one set of comprehensive responses to Coleman and colleagues, see ON
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: PAPERS DERIVING FROM THE HARVARD UNIVERSITY FACULTY SEMINAR ON THE COLEMAN REPORT (Frederick Mosteller & Daniel P. Moy-

nihan eds., 1972).
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mand for empirical legal scholarship, at least among lawmakers and
policymakers, supply an important piece to a larger scholarly puzzle.
Although their observations fuel some level of pessimism about
whether research findings will inform public policy, such pessimism
neither dislodges me from my conclusion in Justice Delayed? nor
diminishes my enthusiasm for on-going and future empirical legal
research projects.

